



From the Roadways to the Forum

Protecting Societies in the Digital Age

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EMILDAI Summer School 2025
León, Spain, July 2nd



All roads lead to Rome

OMNES·VIAE·ROMAM·DUCUNT



Golden Milestone (*Milliarium Aureum*),
Roman km 0, in the Roman Forum



Main Roman roads in time
of Hadrian (r. 117-138)



Roman Forum



Via Appia (Wikipedia)

Roads and forums

- *Roads* and *forums* are critical elements in every civilization

Forums

Discussion, representation, collective decision (forum, *agora* ἀγορά, or square/*plateia* πλατεία), commercial exchange points (market, bazar or souk سوق)



Roman Forum

Roads and infrastructure

Transport, exchange of goods, information and communication flows



Via Appia (Wikipedia)

- ...also at the **digital age**

Cybersecurity as cryptography



■ What typically matters in communication ?

- Data confidentiality
- Data integrity
- Entity authentication

Cybersecurity in the digital age



■ What typically matters in communication ?

- Data *confidentiality*
 - Data *integrity*
 - Entity *authentication*
- ...in an increasingly digital society, “**security/safety in the cyberspace**” is broader:*
- Digital connected *infrastructures* (hardware)
 - AI-dependent digital *services* (software): fairness, transparency

Assessing the impact of digital technologies

- Two interdisciplinary and intersectoral conferences in Brussels, about digital technologies and policy
- Alvolution 2023, on November 16th



HAL
science ouverte



- EUDTP 2025, on May 14th-15th

www.eudtp.sciencesconf.org






**EU Digital
Technologies
and Policies**

14-15 May 2025, Brussels




Some thoughts to share

- On the digital *roads*
 - Physical Internet infrastructure: cables, IXPs, devices, datacenters
 - Logical layers: ASes, routing, filtering, DNS
- On the digital *forums* (*agoras*, markets)
 - Disinformation
 - Digital consumer protection



On the digital roads




Digital services (and in particular, AI-based services) depend on fragile physical **infrastructures** (Internet, IXPs, 5G/6G, datacenters, cables) and **hardware** (chips)

■ Digitized services are “*as vulnerable as their weakest component*”: added vulnerabilities, cybersecurity threats

■ **Energy**: digital and ecological transition may *not* be compatible

■ Raw **materials**: scarcity, sustainability, recycling and reutilisation, geopolitical challenges


Marceau Coupechoux
Télécom Paris, France



Juan Herrera
UPM, Spain



Romain Jacob,
ETH Zürich,
Switzerland




Internet (submarine) cables

- Physically, the Internet is a set of (mostly undersea) cables, each able to carry tens of Tbps...

Stefano de Luca
EPRS, EU





- carrying ~99% of Internet data traffic
- subject to physical attacks
- vulnerable to foreign technology dependency
- ...current priority of EC



Internet infrastructure: it's there until it's not

- Undersea and ground cables meet in Internet eXchange Points (**IXPs**), networks are handled through regional/enterprise Autonomous Systems (**ASes**)
- Vertical integration in communications infrastructure: increasing involvement of GAFAM
Examples: Grace Hopper (USA-UK-Spain, 340 Tbps, Google), APRICOT (Asia-Pacific, 190 Tbps, Google/Meta)...
- **Net neutrality** at risk, as traffic and services concentrate in few powerful (integrated) operators




Internet infrastructure: it's there until it's not


- Why do they matter?
 - Arab springs (2011),
 - Chinese digital wall (*wang guan* 网管, network wall),
 - Russian “sovereign Internet” (RuNet Рунет) project...

- Careful with “sovereignty”: may mean *autonomy*, but also *restriction/suppression*

- Towards a *fragmented* Internet?




Protests in Egypt (2011).



Withdrawal of BGP routes from Egyptian networks (ASes), in Jan. 2011.


On the digital forum: disinformation

- *Disinformation: not a great term!*
 - ...rather, **disruptions in the circulation of information**
- AI and automated content generation: not about **people** (writing, painting, playing), but about data availability and computing **power**
 - We use ChatGPT (or Grok, Gemini, etc.) as **oracles**, not as language models (trained on data, humanly parametrized) — but we already did so with Google, with Wikipedia, etc.
 - Most multimedia content in the Internet will be (*already is?*) synthetic
 - More vulnerable to bots, online campaigns, political micro-targeting in online platforms
 - ...but, disinformation-related concepts are often **ill-defined**



Internet Research Agency (IRA) malicious ads are way more effective than average (O. Goga, Alvolution 2023)

Oana Goga
CNRS, France




We may not agree on what a “political ad” is — and whether it should be subject to regulation (O. Goga, Alvolution 2023)

On the digital forum: consumer protection

■ Data privacy, exploitation and risks of weaponization

■ Data is a **hidden currency** of digital services



■ Algorithmic-driven micro-targeting in social platforms is (implicit, automatic) **user profiling** — and is widely used by businesses



Oana Goga
CNRS, France



■ “**Dark patterns**” in digital design manipulate user behavior




Pratiksha Ashok
Tilburg University,
Netherlands



Is regulation the answer? Maybe, but...

- From an engineering perspective:
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR): $\frac{S}{N}$
- Noise is growing, but its impact is amplified by the signal power (public trust) also decreasing
- ...in part due to the banalization of “disinformation” and “fake news” claims by government officials
- The “disinformation” notion, and related regulation to attempt to control information flows, may be a double-edge sword
- No public trust without **free**, *unrestricted*, circulation of information flows + algorithmic **transparency**



Cicero
MAGAZIN FÜR POLITISCHE KULTUR

Machtverschiebung im Zeitalter der Desinformationsbekämpfung

Für ein Recht auf Desinformation

Der Kampf gegen „Desinformation“ ist zum Instrument der Macht geworden. Was als Abwehr gegen autoritäre Propaganda begann, droht selbst autoritär zu werden. Denn eine Demokratie, die Wahrheit verordnet, hat ihre kritische Vernunft aufgegeben.

VON JAKOB SCHIRRMACHER am 28. Mai 2025 7 min

To conclude: sovereignty, democracy, rights

- Current AI phase is an *acceleration* of a larger revolution in automation & computing
 - AI relies on the ability to collect and exploit massive amounts of *data*: *hidden currency* of digital services
 - The Internet has become the *backbone* of digital societies: infrastructure for the *roads* and the *forum*
- Technology is *dialectical*: ambivalent effects on the environment
 - Augments overall capacities, at the cost of creating new dependencies (and new vulnerabilities!), which may also hurt individual autonomy
 - ...also true for *digital technologies*
- *Forums and roads*
 - Internet infrastructure: risks of regional *fragmentation* and corporate *concentration*
 - *Disinformation*: public trust requires credible institutions, free flow of (quality) information, and algorithmic/institutional transparency
 - Digital *sovereignty*: both *technological autonomy* and power to *restrict/suppress dissent*



Thanks!


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ÉCOLE
POLYTECHNIQUE

China Internet control model : *wang guan* (网管, net wall)

- Some filtering techniques
(source: <https://www.howtogeek.com/162092/htg-explains-how-the-great-firewall-of-china-works/>)
 - IP blacklists
 - URL filtering
 - Deep Packet Inspection over unencrypted packets
 - VPN blocking
 - DNS Poisoning
 - TCP connections resetting
 - ...and a lot of manpower
-
- No measure is **totally** effective... but they only need to be **sufficiently** effective !



Russia Internet control model : RuNet / Рунет

- Developing an ability to “separate” the Russian Internet
(source: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/reassessing-runet-russian-internet-isolation-and-implications-for-russian-cyber-behavior/>)
- Main legal framework:
Sovereign Internet Law (Закон о «суверенном интернете»), 2019
- Towards a national DNS fork for Russia
- Deep Packet Inspection intrusive capabilities by Roskomnadzor
- Tracking of ASNs, IXPs and physical links connecting the Russian Internet to the outside
- Central Internet blacklist maintained by Roskomnadzor since 2012
- Website whitelisting
- ...
- Periodic stability tests on the “isolated” Russian Internet
 - Tested for a full day in Chechnya, in 2024

