Foundations of Proof Systems

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How do we define mathematics?

All humans are mortal, Socrates is human, thus Socrate is mortal.

correction : syntaxic criterion

$$\frac{\vdash A \Rightarrow B \qquad \vdash A}{\vdash B}$$

The stones to build mathematical proofs


$$\frac{\vdash \forall x. H(x) \Rightarrow M(x)}{\vdash H(s) \Rightarrow M(S)} \qquad \vdash H(S)$$
$$\vdash M(S)$$

A mathematical proof is a construction

Birth of modern mathematical logic

Mathematical truth defined through totally objective rules

1872 : The Begriffsschrift of Frege





mechanical verification

proof = tree structure

A century later

Mechanical verification becomes real

First proof system : Automath (1968)



N. G. de Bruijn

Formal proofs are *actually* built.

Today

A modern proof system : Coq

- Same principle
- ▶ More modern formalism



An example: equality



How do we formally define what x=y means?

- We can say equality is the smallest equivalence relation
- We can say equality is the smallest reflexive relation
- ▶ x=y \equiv \forall R, $(\forall$ a, R(a,a)) \Rightarrow R(x,y) (as above written differently)
- Axioms:
 - 1. $\forall x, x=x$
 - 2. If x=y, then any property verified by x is verified by y

or:
$$\forall x y$$
, $x=y \land P(x) \Leftrightarrow P(y)$ (axiom scheme)

or:
$$\forall x y$$
, $x=y \land P(x) \Rightarrow P(y)$ (also scheme)

This is only about equality itself (no axiom like extentionality)
Obviously, these assertions are written in different "languages"
Equivalences between these variants: exercises in Coq



Some important points



- ▶ The language to express propositions ("for any relation...")
- The features for definitions ("the smallest relation...")

but also other points:

the roles of computations

What do we ask from a formalism

Before (informal proofs) : we want the formalism to be expressive (many theorems)

Now (formal proofs) we want also :

- Concise proofs
- Close to our intuition (no spurious syntactical hacking)

This course: study formalisms with these aims in mind

First-order logic - language

A set of variables : x, y, z, ...

A set of function symbols : f, g, h, \ldots each function symbol has an arity (number of arguments).

A set of predicate symbols : A, B, C, P, R... each with an arity.

Objects:

- a variable is a term,
- if f is of arity n and t_1, \ldots, t_n are terms, then $f(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ is a term.

Propositions:

- ightharpoonup if P is of arity n then $P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)$ is a (atomic) proposition
- ▶ is A and B are propositions, $A \wedge B$, $A \vee B$, $A \Rightarrow B$, \bot , $\forall x.A$, $\exists x.B$ are propositions.

Examples (languages of FOL)

Arithmetic (Peano, 1889)

Function symbols : $0, S, +, \times$

Predicate symbol : =

Set Theory (Cantor, Russell, Zermelo, Fraenkel...)

Predicate symbols : \in , =

A theory is:

► A set of axioms (propositions of the language)

Axioms of arithmetic:

$$\forall x, 0 + x = x \qquad \forall x, 0 \times x = 0$$

$$\forall x, y, S(x) + y = S(x + y) \qquad \forall x, y, S(x) \times y = y + x \times y$$

$$\forall x, \neg (0 = S(x))$$

$$\forall x \ y, S(x) = S(y) \Rightarrow x = y$$

$$P(0) \wedge (\forall x, P(x) \Rightarrow P(S(x))) \Rightarrow \forall x, P(x).$$

$$\forall x, x = x \forall x \ y, P(x) \land x = y \Rightarrow P(y).$$

Truth: natural deduction

 Γ set of propositions $\Gamma \vdash A$ A is provable under hypothesises+axioms Γ

$$\frac{A \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash A} \text{ (Ax)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \qquad \Gamma \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \land B} \text{ (} \land \neg \text{I} \text{)} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \land B}{\Gamma \vdash A} \text{ (} \land \neg \text{E}_{1} \text{)} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \land B}{\Gamma \vdash B} \text{ (} \land \neg \text{E}_{2} \text{)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A}{\Gamma \vdash A \lor B} \text{ (} \lor \neg \text{I}_{1} \text{)} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \lor B} \text{ (} \lor \neg \text{I}_{2} \text{)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \lor B \qquad \Gamma, A \vdash C \qquad \Gamma, B \vdash C}{\Gamma \vdash C} \text{ (} \lor \neg \text{E} \text{)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, A \vdash B}{\Gamma \vdash A \Rightarrow B} \text{ (} \Rightarrow \neg \text{I} \text{)} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash A \Rightarrow B \qquad \Gamma \vdash A}{\Gamma \vdash B} \text{ (} \Rightarrow \neg \text{E} \text{)}$$

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash A}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x A}$ (\forall -I) if x not free in Γ

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall x.A}{\Gamma \vdash A[x \setminus t]} \ (\forall -\mathsf{E})$

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash A[x \setminus t]}{\Gamma \vdash \exists_{Y} \Delta} \ (\exists -1)$

 $\frac{\Gamma, A \vdash B \qquad \Gamma \vdash \exists x.A}{\Gamma \vdash B} \quad (\exists -E) \quad \text{if } x \text{ not free in } \Gamma, B$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \bot}{\Gamma \vdash A} \ (\bot - \mathsf{E})$$

(this gives intuitionistic logic

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash A \lor \neg A}$$
 (EM)

(this gives classical logic)

Relating correctness and truth: models and semantics

A set \mathcal{U} (universe)

For every f of arity n, a function $|f|: \mathcal{U}^n \to \mathcal{U}$

For every P of arity n, a function $|P|:\mathcal{U}^n \to \{0,1\}$ (equivalently $|P|\subset \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U}^n)$)

Given any $\mathcal I$ mapping variables x to $\mathcal U$ we define $|t|_{\mathcal I}\in\mathcal U$ by :

- $|x|_{\mathcal{I}} \equiv \mathcal{I}(x)$
- $|f(t_1,\ldots,t_n)|_{\mathcal{I}} \equiv |f|(|t_1|_{\mathcal{I}},\ldots|t_n|_{\mathcal{I}})$

Given any $\mathcal I$ we define $|A| \in \{0,1\}$ by :

- $P(t_1,\ldots,t_n)|_{\mathcal{I}} \equiv |P|(|t_1|_{\mathcal{I}},\ldots|t_n|_{\mathcal{I}})$
- $|A \wedge B|_{\mathcal{I}} \equiv |A|_{\mathcal{I}} \wedge |B|_{\mathcal{I}}$
- ▶ similar for \lor , \Rightarrow , \bot ...
- $|\forall x.A|_{\mathcal{I}} \equiv \min_{\alpha \in \mathcal{U}} |A|_{\mathcal{I}; x \leftarrow \alpha}$
- ▶ $|\exists x.A|_{\mathcal{I}} \equiv \max_{\alpha \in \mathcal{U}} |A|_{\mathcal{I};x \leftarrow \alpha}$ (this is very much classical logic)

Model of a theory

A model is a triple : \mathcal{U} , interpretation of fs, interpretation of Ps. It is a model of a theory \mathcal{T} if for any $A \in \mathcal{T}$, $|A|_{\mathcal{I}} = 1$ (for any \mathcal{I} since A is closed)

Correctness: If $\Gamma \vdash A$, and $\forall B \in \Gamma, |B|_{\mathcal{I}} = 1$, then $|A|_{\mathcal{I}} = 1$. proof: quite straightforward (good exercise)

Coherence : There is no proof of $\mathcal{T} \vdash \bot$ (easy consequence of correctness)

Completeness: If for any model validating Γ , $|A|_{\mathcal{I}}=1$, then $\Gamma \vdash A$ is provable. proof: more difficult (Gödel's PhD)

- Relates correctness with truth
- ▶ incompleteness : limit of « truth » in math

An extension of first-order logic

Deduction modulo: we add rewrite rules to the language

$$0 + x > x$$

$$S(x) + y > S(x + y)$$

$$0 \times x > 0$$

$$S(x) \times y > y + x \times y$$

we allow reasoning modulo the rewrite rules :

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \phi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi} \text{ if } \phi =_R \psi$$

How to prove 2 + 2 = 4?

Replacing more axioms by rewrite rules

How to ensure $0 \neq 1$?

$$\forall x.0 \neq S(x)$$

Add a new predicate symbol EQZ

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathsf{EQZ}(0) & \rhd & \top \\ \mathsf{EQZ}(S(x)) & \rhd & \bot \end{array}$$

Exercise: finish the proof

Important : avoiding messy rewrite rules $(A \land B \rhd \bot \dots)$

Replacing more axioms by rewrite rules(2)

How to ensure $\forall x. \forall y. S(x) = S(y) \Rightarrow x = y$? (injectivity of S) Add a new function symbol pred

$$pred(S(x)) > x$$

 $pred(0) > 0$ (or whatever)

Exercise: finish the proof

A "simple" presentation of Arithmetic

Rules:

$$0+x > x$$
 EQZ(0) \triangleright T
 $S(x)+y > S(x+y)$ EQZ($S(x)$) \triangleright \bot
 $O \times x > 0$ pred($S(x)$) \triangleright x
 $S(x) \times y > y+x \times y$ pred(0) \triangleright 0

Axioms :

$$\forall x.x = x$$

$$\forall x. \forall y.x = y \land P(x) \Rightarrow P(y)$$

$$P(0) \land (\forall x. P(x) \Rightarrow P(S(x))) \Rightarrow \forall y. P(y)$$

Cuts in proofs

Another form of dynamics \slash computation \slash transformation in proofs

What is a cut?

- 1. Prove $\forall a. \forall b. (a+b)^2 = a^2 + b^2 + 2ab$ (ends with \forall -intro)
- 2. Deduces $\forall b.(3+b)^2 = 9 + b^2 + 6b$ (use \forall -elim)

We could have proved (2) directly (following the same scheme as 1)

Logical Cut

An introduction rule followed by the corresponding elimination rule

$$\frac{\frac{\sigma_1}{\Gamma \vdash A} \quad \frac{\sigma_2}{\Gamma \vdash B}}{\frac{\Gamma \vdash A \land B}{\Gamma \vdash A} \quad (\land \text{-i})} \quad (\land \text{-i})$$

Simplifies to:

$$\frac{\sigma_1}{\Gamma \vdash A}$$

exercise: find the simplification for the other logical cuts

Cut Elimination

- Does this process terminate?
- ▶ If we have a proof of $\Gamma \vdash A$, can we find a cut-free proof?

Termination : a major point of this course

Cut-free proofs

Why does it matter to us?

In a cut-free proof, there are only axiom rules above elimination rules (or the EM)

If a proof is cut-free, without axiom and constructive, it ends with an introduction rule.

A proof of $\vdash A \lor B$ that is constructive and cut-free ends with $\lor -i1$ of $\lor -i2$.

A proof of $\vdash \exists x. A(x)$ that is constructive and cut-free contains a witness.

Cut Free - axiom free proofs

Lemma : a cut free derivation (proof) of $[] \vdash A$ always ends with an introduction rule.

Proof: by induction over the derivation (could be the length of the derivation, but not necessary).

Let us do a few cases.

Why "natural" deduction?

The ND rules aim at corresponding to actual (human) deduction steps.

Indeed:

Coq's formalism includes / extends first-order logic with some rewrite/computation rules.

Proofs are built top-down (goal-driven) and basic tactics correspond to ND rules

Next:: cuts and constructivity in Heyting Arithmetic