MPRI 2-7-1

week 4 - Oct. 5th

Functions in HOL

One version of HOL

<u>base types</u> : ι and o
HOL rules for $\Rightarrow$ and $\forall$

<u>constants</u>: 0, S, + $\times$
<u>Axioms</u>: $\forall$ x. 0+x = x, $\forall$ x y . S(x) + y = S(x + y),
$\forall$ x. 0 $\times$ x = 0, $\forall$ x y . S(x) $\times$ y = x $\times$ y + y,
$\forall$ x. 0 $\neq$ S(x), injectivity of S
induction

Can be extended with more base types and induction principles
Can be extended with the excluded middle

Implemented and used in real systems : HOL, HOL-light, Isabelle-HOL…

Some properties of HOL

Very simple model

Model of simply typed λ-calculus, $|\iota| \equiv N$, $|o| \equiv \{0,1\}$
$|\Rightarrow| \equiv$ boolean implication

$|\forall_T|(A) \equiv \min_{\alpha \in |T|} |A|(\alpha)$
$|0| \equiv 0$, $|S| \equiv x \mapsto x+1$, …

The formalism enjoys cut-elimination property
Intuitionistic proofs are constructive

Some inductive definitions in HOL

The smallest set such that :

- *even* (0)
- ∀ x. *even* (x) ⇒ *even* (S(S(x)))

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$$(\mathit{even}\ \ n) \equiv \ \forall X : \iota \rightarrow o\ .$$

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A Proof by induction

$\forall X : \iota \to o\ .$

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$(\mathit{even}\ x) \Rightarrow \exists y . x = y + y$

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$(\exists y . 0 = y + y) \Rightarrow$

$(\forall x.\ \exists y . x = y + y \Rightarrow \exists y . (S\ (S\ x)) = y + y) \Rightarrow$

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$(\exists y . 0 = y + y) \Rightarrow$

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two induction cases to prove

A more advanced inductive predicate

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base case : t is normal (then it is SN)

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base case : t is normal (then it is SN)

$(SN\ u) \equiv$

$\forall X : \Lambda \rightarrow o\ .$

$(\forall t : \Lambda\ .\ (\forall t' : \Lambda\ .\ (\beta\ t\ t') \Rightarrow X\ t') \Rightarrow X\ t)$

$\Rightarrow (X\ u)$

Using this definition

$$\forall X : \Lambda \to o \,.\ \ (\forall t : \Lambda \,.\ (\forall t' : \Lambda \,.\ (\beta\ t\ t') \Rightarrow X\ t') \ \Rightarrow t) \ \Rightarrow (X\ u)$$

Can we prove $(\beta\ u\ u)$ is false ?

Using this definition

$$\forall X : \Lambda \rightarrow o \,.\ (\forall t : \Lambda \,.\ (\forall t' : \Lambda \,.\ (\beta\ t\ t') \Rightarrow X\ t') \Rightarrow t) \Rightarrow (X\ u)$$

Can we prove $(\beta\ u\ u)$ is false ?

$$(\forall t : \Lambda \,.\ (\forall t' : \Lambda \,.\ (\beta\ t\ t') \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ t'\ t')) \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ t\ t)) \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ u\ u)$$

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given t, $\forall t' : \Lambda . (\beta\ t\ t') \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ t'\ t')$ show $\neg(\beta\ t\ t)$

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Can we prove $(\beta\ u\ u)$ is false ?

$$(\forall t : \Lambda . (\forall t' : \Lambda . (\beta\ t\ t') \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ t'\ t')) \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ t\ t)) \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ u\ u)$$

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given t, $\forall t' : \Lambda . (\beta\ t\ t') \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ t'\ t')$ show $\neg(\beta\ t\ t)$

$(\beta\ t\ t) \Rightarrow \neg(\beta\ t\ t)$ indeed entails $\neg(\beta\ t\ t)$

Specifying a recursive function

We want : $(\exp x\ 0) = (S\ 0)$

$(\exp x\ (S\ y)) = (\exp x\ y) \times x$

$\exp x\ 0\ r \quad \Rightarrow \quad r = (S\ 0)$

$\exp x\ (S\ y)\ r \quad \Rightarrow \quad r = \times\ x\ r' \wedge \exp x\ y\ r'$

$\exp a\ b\ c \equiv$

$\forall R : \iota \to \iota \to \iota \to o\ .$

$(\forall x\ .\ R\ x\ 0\ 1) \to$

$(\forall x\ y\ r.\ R\ x\ y\ r \to R\ x\ (S\ y)\ x \times r) \to$

$(R\ a\ b\ c)$

Specifying a recursive function

$$Ack(0, n) = (S\ n)$$
$$Ack(S\ m, 0) = Ack(m, (S\ 0))$$
$$Ack(S\ m, S\ n) = Ack(m, Ack(S\ m, n))$$

$\lambda\ a{:}\iota.\lambda\ b{:}\iota.\lambda\ r{:}\iota.$

$\forall\ X : \iota\rightarrow \iota\rightarrow \iota\rightarrow o\ .$

$(\forall\ n.\ (X\ 0\ n\ (S\ n)) \Rightarrow$

$(\ \forall\ m.\ \forall\ r.\ (X\ m\ (S\ 0)\ r) \Rightarrow (X\ (S\ m)\ 0\ r)) \Rightarrow$

$(\ \forall\ m.\ \forall\ n.\ \forall\ r.\ \forall\ r'.\ (X\ (S\ m)\ n\ r') \Rightarrow (X\ m\ r'\ r) \Rightarrow (X\ (S\ m)(S\ n)\ r)) => $

$(X\ a\ b\ r)$

Proving the existence of a recursive function

Ack ≡ $\lambda\, a{:}\iota.\lambda\, b{:}\iota.\lambda\, r{:}\iota.$

$\forall X : \iota \to \iota \to \iota \to o\ .$

$(\forall n.\ (X\ 0\ n\ (S\ n)) \Rightarrow$

$(\ \forall m.\ \forall r.\ (X\ m\ (S\ 0)\ r) \Rightarrow (X\ (S\ m)\ 0\ r)) \Rightarrow$

$(\ \forall m.\ \forall n.\ \forall r.\ \forall r'.\ (X\ (S\ m)\ n\ r') \Rightarrow (X\ m\ r'\ r) \Rightarrow (X\ (S\ m)(S\ n)\ r)) =>$

$(X\ a\ b\ r)$

$\forall a\ .\ \forall b\ .\ \exists r\ .\ (Ack\ a\ b\ r)$ by induction

induction over a : $\forall b\ .\ \exists r\ .\ (Ack\ a\ b\ r)$

$\forall b\ .\ \exists r\ .\ (Ack\ 0\ b\ r)$

$\forall b\ .\ \exists r\ .\ (Ack\ a\ b\ r) \Rightarrow \forall b\ .\ \exists r\ .\ (Ack\ (S\ a)\ b\ r)$

Proving the existence of a recursive function

$$\begin{aligned}
Ack \equiv\ & \lambda\, a{:}\iota.\lambda\, b{:}\iota.\lambda\, r{:}\iota. \\
& \forall X : \iota \to \iota \to \iota \to o\,. \\
& \quad (\forall n.\ (X\ 0\ n\ (S\ n)) \Rightarrow \\
& \quad (\forall m.\ \forall r.\ (X\ m\ (S\ 0)\ r) \Rightarrow (X\ (S\ m)\ 0\ r)) \Rightarrow \\
& \quad (\forall m.\ \forall n.\ \forall r.\ \forall r'.\ (X\ (S\ m)\ n\ r') \Rightarrow (X\ m\ r'\ r) \Rightarrow (X\ (S\ m)(S\ n)\ r)) => \\
& \quad\ (X\ a\ b\ r)
\end{aligned}$$

induction over a : $\forall b\,.\ \exists r\,.\ (Ack\ a\ b\ r)$

$\forall b\,.\ \exists r\,.\ (Ack\ 0\ b\ r)$

$\forall b\,.\ \exists r\,.\ (Ack\ a\ b\ r) \Rightarrow \forall b\,.\ \exists r\,.\ (Ack\ (S\ a)\ b\ r)$

induction over b : $\exists r\,.\ (Ack\ (S\ a)\ b\ r)$

$\exists r\,.\ (Ack\ (S\ a)\ 0\ r)$

$\exists r\,.\ (Ack\ (S\ a)\ (S\ b)\ r)$

Naming functions: Hilbert operator

Extending the language

$\varepsilon(P)$

"If one guy can do it, it's ε"

Naming functions: Hilbert operator

Extending the language

ε(P) "The" object verifying P

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$$\frac{\vdash (P\ t)}{\vdash (P\ \varepsilon(P))}$$

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Extending the language

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$$\frac{\vdash (P\ t)}{\vdash (P\ \varepsilon(P))}$$

"If one guy can do it, it's ε"

$$\exists x .\ P\ x \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad P\ \varepsilon(P)$$

(can be used instead of $\exists$)

Using the Hilbert operator

exp_f a b = ε(λ x . (exp a b x))

exp_f = λ a . λ b . ε(λ x . (exp a b x))

We can show exp_f a 0 = 1, exp_f a (S b) = a × exp_f a b

The proof of these equations can be mechanized

What do we miss ? Computations !

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  - These tactics are the Trusted Computing Base
  - More complex tactics are assembled on top of those tactics (using ML)

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2. $(A \lor \neg A) \land (B \lor \neg B) \Rightarrow (A \land B) \lor \neg(A \land B)$
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with ε, Heyting arithmetic becomes classical !

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We prove that for any proposition A, $\vdash A \vee \neg A$ holds (is provable) by induction over the size of A

1. $\forall x . \forall y . x=y \vee x \neq y$ is provable in HA
2. $(A \vee \neg A) \wedge (B \vee \neg B) \Rightarrow (A \wedge B) \vee \neg(A \wedge B)$
3. $(A \vee \neg A) \wedge (B \vee \neg B) \Rightarrow (A \vee B) \vee \neg(A \vee B)$

Suppose we know :

$\forall x. A(x) \vee \neg A(x) \quad (\exists x. A(x)) \vee \neg(\exists x. A(x))$

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Suppose we know :

$\forall x. A(x) \vee \neg A(x)$ $(\exists x. A(x)) \vee \neg(\exists x. A(x))$

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number of connectives

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$\vdash \forall x.\ A(x) \vee \neg A(x)$ let us prove $\vdash (\exists x.\ A(x)) \vee \neg(\exists x.\ A(x))$

by I.H : $\vdash A(\varepsilon(A)) \vee \neg A(\varepsilon(A))$

if $A(\varepsilon(A))$, then $\exists x.\ A(x)$ (trivial)

if $\neg A(\varepsilon(A))$: $\exists x.\ A(x)$ entails $A(\varepsilon(A))$, thus $\bot$.

so $\neg(\exists x.\ A(x))$

We prove that for any proposition A, $\vdash A \lor \neg A$ holds (is provable)

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now, given x, we can show $\neg A(x) \Rightarrow \exists y.\ \neg A(y)$

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now, given x, we can show $\neg A(x) \Rightarrow \exists y.\ \neg A(y) \Rightarrow \bot$

We prove that for any proposition A, $\vdash A \lor \neg A$ holds (is provable) by induction over the size of A

Suppose we know :

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so $\neg(\exists x.\ \neg A(x))$

now, given x, we can show $\neg A(x) \Rightarrow \exists y.\ \neg A(y) \Rightarrow \bot$

so $\forall x.\ \neg\neg A(x)$

We prove that for any proposition A, $\vdash A \vee \neg A$ holds (is provable)

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Suppose we know :

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if $A(\varepsilon(\neg A))$: $\exists x.\ \neg A(x)$ entails $\neg A(\varepsilon(\neg A))$, thus $\bot$.

so $\neg(\exists x.\ \neg A(x))$

now, given x, we can show $\neg A(x) \Rightarrow \exists y.\ \neg A(y) \Rightarrow \bot$

so $\forall x.\ \neg\neg A(x)$ but $A(x) \vee \neg A(x)$

We prove that for any proposition A, $\vdash A \vee \neg A$ holds (is provable)

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Suppose we know :

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if $A(\varepsilon(\neg A))$: $\exists x.\ \neg A(x)$ entails $\neg A(\varepsilon(\neg A))$, thus $\bot$.

so $\neg(\exists x.\ \neg A(x))$

now, given x, we can show $\neg A(x) \Rightarrow \exists y.\ \neg A(y) \Rightarrow \bot$

so $\forall x.\ \neg\neg A(x)$ but $A(x) \vee \neg A(x)$

so $\forall x.\ A(x)$

Summing up

In other words :
Heyting arithmetic with Hilbert operator = Peano + Hilbert operator

Computing with epsilon is not easy

However, HOL (without epsilon and EM) is constructive

I was asked : what is the difference between HOL and system F ?

HOL : formalism — quantification over propositions

System F : type system — quantification over types

Link : when we view proofs as λ-terms (starting next week)

Normalization of system F (actually F_ω) will allow to show cut elimination in HOL